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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the history of warfare, the use of non-traditional soldiers, weapons 
and tactics to counter the conventional military has become increasingly important.  Our 
enemies in the 21st century rely upon unconventional and irregular methods of warfare to 
attack the United States.  To counter this threat, the U.S. Air Force must ensure the right 
mix of aircraft to protect America from attack.  What is the role of airpower in this new 
era of conflict?  These roles will be defined through case studies in both unconventional 
warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN).  I will argue that despite the capabilities of 
the current Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) fleet of aircraft, it lacks the 
capability to successfully engage in UW and COIN throughout the globe.  The current 
attack and mobility fleet is too large for a majority of the world’s airfields, and is too 
expensive (required infrastructure to support such aircraft) to transfer to partner nations.  
I recommend AFSOC acquire additional light attack, light mobility, light utility and 
rotary wing aircraft to meet the 21st century requirements of irregular warfare. 
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I. THE ROLE OF AIRPOWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Warfare today has taken on a new form and grown to new levels.  The 
type of warfare is not new, and few of the tactics are new.  What is new is 
that this type of war has recently reached a global level—and the United 
States and its allies have found themselves ill prepared.  Many strategists 
and theorists have attempted to grasp the concept of the war we are facing 
today, yet none have adequately given it definition and understanding. 
                                —Retired U.S. Army General Gordon Sulliven1 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States stood alone as 
the singular super power.   The United States had a large, conventional military force that 
was designed to protect America throughout the bipolar confrontation of the Cold War, a 
force that was designed to fight state on state conflicts.  The collapse of the Soviet Union 
was caused by many different factors, to include social, economic and military reasons.  
One contributing factor was the protracted conflict in Afghanistan (1979–1989). Lessons 
from this conflict taught that asymmetric warfare—or to use today’s term irregular 
warfare (IW)—could burden a large conventional force, even defeating it.   Now, the 
United States faces complex adversaries in a global environment who adopt asymmetric 
approaches to warfare in order to challenge U.S. power.  As U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates stated:   
The categories of warfare are blurring and no longer fit into neat, tidy 
boxes.  One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction—from 
the sophisticated to the simple—being employed simultaneously in hybrid 
and more complex forms of warfare.2 
This paper focuses on the role that airpower will play in irregular warfare during 
the 21st century.  Recommendations include developing a robust aviation IW capability 
                                                 
1 Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence, http://www.irregularwarfare.org/CofE.html (accessed 
October 6, 2009). 
2 Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence. 
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that is not dismantled post conflict, then resurrected when the next crisis occurs.  As 
currently defined by the Joint Operating Concept, IW consists of 14 independent 
activities.  However, two of these activities, Unconventional Warfare (UW) and 
Counterinsurgency (COIN), are the heart of IW and are currently the most prevalent 
forms of IW.  Thus, this paper will focus on the role of airpower in these two IW 
activities.  Further, I will limit the discussion to the current capabilities of Air Force 
Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviation assets.  I will not include in this 
discussion other government agencies and Department of Defense (DoD) services that 
have (or are trying to acquire) aviation assets that will be identified as UW or COIN 
aviation requirements.  However, through the historical case studies, the other agencies’ 
assets will be used to show how the aviation requirements for UW and COIN were 
developed.  To enable airmen to comprehend their role in IW, a common definitional 
understanding of what each term means is required.    
B.  DEFINITIONS3 
1. Irregular Warfare (IW) 
The Third Geneva Convention coined the term “regular armed forces” in 1949.  
As principal drafters of the Third Geneva Convention, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) determined that the term “regular armed forces” applied to those who 
qualified as belligerents in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  In order to be 
considered “regular forces” they must:  
1.  Be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates 
2.  Have a fixed, distinctive emblem recognizable from a distance  
3.  Carry arms openly 
4.  Conduct operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war4  
The opposite of “regular forces” is “irregular forces.”  These forces are defined by 
international humanitarian law as combatants who do not belong to the nation-state 
                                                 
3 See Appendix for additional terms relating to IW. 
4 Hague Convention of 1899. Annex to the Convention, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 1. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp (accessed July 17, 2009). 
 3
identified “regular forces.”5  Additionally, “irregular forces” are forces who conduct 
irregular warfare.  IW has become an umbrella term for the spectrum of war previously 
known as guerilla warfare, small war, low intensity conflict or limited wars.  In 2008, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) produced Directive 3000.07, establishing policy and 
assigning responsibility for the conduct of irregular warfare.  In addition, this directed the 
DoD to develop capabilities in order to address IW challenges to national security.  
Directive 3000.07 defines irregular warfare as: 
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant population(s).  Irregular warfare favors indirect 
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of 
military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence and will.6 
According to the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, the following 
activities are included in the range of operations considered part of IW:   
1. Insurgency 
2. Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
3. Unconventional Warfare (UW) 
4. Terrorism 
5. Counterterrorism (CT) 
6. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
7. Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations 
(SSTRO)  
8. Strategic Communications 
9. Psychological Operations (PYSOP) 
10. Information Operations (IO) 
11. Civil–Military Operations (CMO) 
12. Intelligence and counterintelligence Activities 
13. Transnational criminal activities, including narcotics trafficking, illicit 
arms dealing, and illegal financial transactions, that support or sustain IW 
14. Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries7  
 
                                                 
5ICRC fact page  http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5kzf5n?opendocument (accessed 
July 17, 2009). 
6 U.S. Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, Irregular Warfare (IW), Washington, DC: GPO, 11. 
7 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), version 1.0, 
September 11, 2007, 9–10. 
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Many of the other 12 activities on this list are subsets or incorporated into UW or COIN 
operations.  For example, PYSOPs are used in UW and COIN, as well as IO and CMO.   
2. Unconventional Warfare (UW)   
The term UW has been defined differently by the services (Army, Air Force, and 
Navy).  The definition has also changed over time. The definition and interpretation of 
UW has varied from World War II through today as it has been used to describe the “gray 
area” that exists between political conflict and open war.8  Despite these definitional 
differences, a basic understanding of UW has prevailed.  For the purpose of this paper, I 
will use the UW definition presented at the UW Definition Working Group (U.S. Army 
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School) presented on April 9, 2009: 
Unconventional Warfare: Activities conducted to enable resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow an occupying 
power or government by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area.9   
Admiral Olson, Commander of United States Special Operations Command, also 
directed that this definition be immediately used by all Special Operations Forces (SOF).  
Further, Olson claims, “…that UW is bigger than SOF and bigger than DoD.  Other 
agencies of government also perform many “activities” of UW.  The definition I 
approved is valid insofar as it relates to activities performed by elements of DoD.”10  In 
the new joint agency environment, it is wise to ensure all definitions of UW activities are 
understood by all players.  
                                                 
8 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2006), 20.  
9 UW Definition Working Group Outbrief, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School. April 9, 2009. 
10 From Admiral Eric Olsen, to selected USSOCOM staff, subject line: “Unconventional Warfare 
(UW) definition” dated June 11, 2009.  The United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
through the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS) is currently in the process of 
providing this new definition of UW for inclusion in all Office of the Secretary of Defense, joint and 
Service publications.  In a memo dated June 11, 2009, United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCM) commander, Admiral Eric Olson, stated that his newly approved definition of UW “has 
immediate authority within the Army because the USASOC/JFKSWCS is assigned responsibility by the 
Army for UW doctrine.”    
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3. Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
The countries of Afghanistan and Iraq are experiencing ongoing insurgencies.  In 
response, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), DoD and the 
Department of State (DoS) joined together and co-authored the U.S. Government 
Counterinsurgency Guide.  This document defines insurgency as “the organized use of 
subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region.”11  
Therefore, a counterinsurgency effort would include “comprehensive civilian and 
military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root 
causes.”12   
C. ORGANIZATION 
Historically, the Air Force has successfully supported IW operations.  However, 
the Air Force has not maintained a consistent IW capability, having allowed IW 
capabilities to atrophy post conflict.  This paper will explore the role the Air Force played 
in the Balkans UW campaign during World War II.   Next, it will explore the role of the 
Air Force in COIN through operations in Laos during the 1960s.  Each case study will 
analyze the irregular/unconventional combat with a focus on aircraft capabilities, 
requirements of aircrew, and the battlefield effectiveness of airpower.  From this study, a 
general list of missions will be developed.  I will then analyze the current AFSOC 
inventory to determine if those particular aircraft capabilities exist or if they have 
atrophied at the conclusion of a conflict.  A recommendation will be made about the 
generic aircraft types required to support future IW operations.  Finally, to meet the 
expected ongoing need for IW air force capability, the thesis recommends breaking the 
cycle of dismantling IW capability by having the Air Force develop an aircraft fleet 
designed specifically to handle IW activities.  In addition, the Air Force must decide  
 
 
                                                 
11 U.S. Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, Counterinsurgency Guide, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, January 2009), 6. 
12 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 12. 
 6
between developing a dedicated IW squadron, group and/or wing or providing airpower 
through a task force organization tailored specifically to meet the needs of a specific 
situation.     
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II.  CASE STUDIES: AIRPOWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
A. UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (UW) 
1.  Background 
The U.S. military began using the term unconventional warfare during the Second 
World War.  Examples of UW are the resistance movements that evolved under Nazi-
occupied Europe and in regions of the Far East under the Empire of Japan.  Allied 
support to these operations included the Jedburgh teams.  These teams consisted of one 
U.S. soldier, one UK soldier, and one French soldier who infiltrated occupied Europe and 
established resistance networks.  Once a network was established, they gathered 
intelligence, sabotaged and harassed German forces, and assisted in recovery of downed 
allied aviators.13  Airpower played a crucial role in the success of these UW missions.  
The Army Air Forces established Carpetbagger units, which provided specialized aircraft 
(modified B-17 and B-24 bombers as well as C-47 Dakota transports) to infiltrate the 
Jedburgh teams.  The Carpetbaggers resupplied a team by air once it was established 
behind enemy lines.  This resupply system included creating and modifying aerial 
delivery techniques plus equipment in order to accomplish the mission.14   
The importance of unconventional warfare during World War II is small 
compared to the role of conventional warfare.  In his book, The Second World War, John 
Keegan states that historians tend to use Yugoslavia to argue “for the effectiveness of 
partisan warfare and in estimating the contribution of resistance forces to the defeat of the 
Wehrmacht in Europe in the Second World War.”15  Keegan disputes the claim that Tito 
liberated his country while tying down significant Axis forces with just Partisans; and 
that his action significantly impacted the eastern and Mediterranean theaters.  Rather, it is 
                                                 
13 S. J. Lewis, “Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944,” 
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Lewis/Lewis.asp (accessed July 31, 2009).   
14 “USAF Special Operations,” http://www.specwarnet.net/americas/usaf.htm (accessed July 24, 
2009). 
15 John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Viking Press, 1990), 492. 
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now accepted that Yugoslavia was liberated in September 1944, as a direct result of the 
Soviet Army advance.16  The Germans maintained 20 Divisions (although not front line 
quality) within Yugoslavia to counter the Partisans.  Unfortunately, it is very difficult to 
measure the exact impact the guerrilla force had on the surrounding theaters.   
…the true worth of a partisan/guerilla operation is not measured in hard 
numbers.  It is best evaluated in those things that are difficult to measure, 
such as the morale of the enemy and the erosion of their will to fight as a 
result of a continuing campaign of unexpected partisan/guerilla actions 
against what are considered safe targets.17 
For the purpose of this paper, the precise impact of the Partisans on the war in 
Europe is not important.  The key point is the role and impact airpower played in 
supporting the Partisan force.    
2.  Framework 
The case study of unconventional warfare in this thesis, support to the Partisans in 
Yugoslavia, occurred while the Air Force was still developing basic theory and doctrine, 
which focused on strategic bombardment.  While strategic bombing was the main focus 
of airpower, some airmen explored additional roles, missions and capabilities provided 
by aircraft that were not related to strategic bombing.  The Partisans who fought a 
guerilla campaign against occupation forces from Italy and Germany had questionable 
success and influence upon the outcome of the conflict in the Balkans.  However, one 
thing is certain, without airpower, the Partisans would have met an unfortunate fate at the 
hands of the German forces.  Analysis will be conducted by using the Seven Phases of 
U.S. Sponsorship of Unconventional Warfare (Figure 1) to see how and where airpower 
was able to influence the UW campaign.  Despite the technological limitations of the 
Mediterranean Air Force, which limited their support to Phase VI, airpower does have an 
important role in each of the seven phases.  The aircraft used in this conflict were 
converted conventional strategic bombers (B-17 and B-24) and modified cargo (C-47) 
aircraft.   
                                                 
16 Keegan, The Second World War, 494. 
17 Ben S. Malcom, White Tigers (Washington: Brassey’s, 1996), 192.   
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Figure 1.   The Seven Phase of U.S. Sponsorship for Unconventional Warfare18 
3. UW in the Balkans  
In early 1941, Yugoslavia feared an invasion from the European Axis powers, 
Germany and Italy.  In an attempt to prevent an invasion, Prince Paul signed the 
Tripartite Pact, aligning with Germany and Italy.  Two days later, Prince Paul was 
removed from office by a coup d’état and replaced by Prince Peter.  Peter quickly moved 
to re-affirm the Pact to prevent invasion. However, Hitler suspected Peter was being 
manipulated by the British and ordered the invasion of Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941.19  A 
combined force of fifty-two German, Italian and Hungarian divisions invaded 
                                                 
18 From Mark Grdovic, “A Leader’s Guide for Unconventional Warfare,” December 12, 2008, 11. 
19 Philip Anthony Towle, Pilots and Rebels (London: Brassey’s, 1989), 59.  
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Yugoslavia.  The Yugoslav Army lacked modern equipment, mobility and firepower.  
The Axis forces quickly overwhelmed the Yugoslav forces through superior firepower 
coupled with a multipronged invasion.  By April 17, 1941, Sarajevo fell and Yugoslavia 
officially surrendered to Axis forces.  Yugoslavia was carved into multiple puppet states 
under Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria.20  Figure 2 depicts the Axis occupied 
territory of Yugoslavia in 1941.    
 
Figure 2.   1941 Yugoslavia under Axis Control21 
                                                 
20 Keegan, The Second World War, 151–157. 
21 From “Yugoslav Front (World War II),” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yugoslavia_in_World_War_II 
(accessed October 28, 2009). 
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4.  Phase I: Preparation  
Resistance and external sponsors conduct PYSOP to unify population 
against established government or occupying power and prepare 
population to receive support.22   
Prior to the Axis invasion, political turmoil within Yugoslavia caused unrest and 
division between the royal government and the rising communist party.  The growing 
communist movement created a split within Yugoslavian politics.  This division was 
evidenced by communist opposition to the political treatises signed by the Royal 
Yugoslav government attempting to secure neutrality for Yugoslavia in Europe’s 
impending conflict.  The split finally broke Yugoslavian political solidarity when Prince 
Peter was removed from power during a coup d’état in early 1941.  Compounding the 
fragile political situation in Yugoslavia was the rising fear of a Europe dominated by 
Nazi Germany.  The coup confused the political situation within Yugoslavia and called 
into question the ability of the government to honor treaties, which in turn sparked 
Hitler’s invasion.23   
Immediately following the Axis invasion, the Yugoslav Communist Party formed 
a military committee headed by Josip Broz Tito.  This newly formed group, known as the 
Partisans, began planning an unconventional warfare campaign against the occupation 
forces.  Forces loyal to the royal government in exile were led by a small band of army 
officers including Colonel Draza Mihalovic.  These soldiers formed another guerilla 
organization, the Cetnici, to liberate Yugoslavia from the occupation forces.  Initially, the 
Allies provided support to the Cetnici, based on their military experience and loyalty to 
the royal government in exile.24  The allies feared getting involved in a civil war between 
the government in exile and the communists, therefore the Partisans did not receive much 
initial aid.  However, the Axis provided a common enemy that the Cetnici, Partisans and 
allies could unite against. 
                                                 
22 Grdovic, “A Leader’s Guide for Unconventional Warfare,” 11. 
23 “The Resistance Movement,” Yugoslavia, http://www.country-data.com (accessed August 14, 
2009). 
24 “The Resistance Movement.”  
 12
The speed of the Axis advance through Yugoslavia prevented allied airpower 
from performing much of a role in Phase I operations.  The following description is what 
airpower provides to Phase I operations in an “ideal” situation.  The primary role of 
airpower during Phase I is intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and 
psychological operations (PYSOPs).  ISR operations build the situational awareness 
picture for both airmen and ground teams who will eventually infiltrate the target country 
and begin a resistance movement.  ISR provides the enemy order of battle as well as 
exposes weaknesses that can be exploited as the resistance grows.  The PYSOP campaign 
could include, but is not limited to, information operations conducted by both air and 
ground assets of the Air Force.  These operations may include leaflet drops, radio and 
television broadcasts, and cyberspace activities all of which are designed to solidify the 
resistance and establish an environment conducive for growth of the resistance.   
5.  Phase II: Initial Contact  
Government agencies coordinate with allied government-in-exile or 
resistance leadership for desired support.25 
The British government contacted the Royal Yugoslavian government in exile 
following the Axis invasion.  Initially, the Cetnici appeared to be better organized and 
better equipped to form a resistance organization.  The Cetnici acquired their arms from 
the Yugoslavian Army stores and had many former Yugoslavian military officers in their 
ranks.  Therefore, the British determined the Cetnici would receive the bulk of aid 
dedicated to the Balkans.  The British also contacted Tito to support his Partisans; 
however, this support was significantly less than what was given to the Cetnici.  The 
Partisans relied primarily upon weapons smuggled into the country prior to the invasion 
by Germany as well as acquiring arms from the extended supply lines that fed the Axis 
front lines.  Initially, both resistance organizations requested explosives and demolition 
charges that would aid in sabotage from the allies.  
During Phase II, airpower continues Phase I operations in addition to requiring 
light mobility assets.  Depending on the location of the government-in-exile or resistance 
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leadership, small transport aircraft with short takeoff and landing capabilities (STOL) or 
rotary wing aircraft provide the necessary transportation of U.S. officials to meet with the 
resistance leadership.  Depending on the political situation, it may be desirable to use 
small, unmarked aircraft, including those indigenous to the area.  Additionally, 
communication links will be established between the leaders of the resistance and the 
U.S. government agencies handling the UW campaign.  With these links, the resistance 
can begin to detail their requirements and the U.S. agency can develop a plan of how to 
support their needs and requests.  The U.S. agencies begin coordination with the 
resistance leadership for possible drop zones and landing zones as required.  ISR assists 
with this identification process as well as builds a bigger intelligence picture of the 
situation in the target country.  
6.  Phase III: Infiltration 
Teams infiltrate operational area, establish communications with its 
base, and contact the resistance organization.26 
Prior to the Axis forces securing the coastal regions, the British transported a 
considerable amount of agents and supplies by sea to assist with the unconventional 
warfare campaign.  The allies ignored internal Yugoslav politics and supplied aid to both 
the Cetnici and the Partisans, focusing on defeating the Axis powers first.27  By 
supplying both resistance groups, the allies determined to decide the fate of internal 
Yugoslav politics at a later date.  Despite increasing indications the Cetnici were 
switching to the Axis side, the allies continued supply them into 1942.     
In Phase III, airpower is used to infiltrate the agents from the U.S. agencies who 
are sponsoring the UW campaign.  Critical to this phase is the desire of the U.S. 
government to maintain the UW campaign as a covert or clandestine mission.  If the 
desire is to ensure the mission remains covert, then the infiltration platforms need to be 
unmarked and as similar to the indigenous aircraft of the region as possible.  Another 
factor that impacts aircraft selection is the air defense threat posed by the government 
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force or occupation power.  Aircraft defensive suites may impact the desire to involve 
certain smaller mobility aircraft in environments where the air threat is considered 
significant.  Additional factors for consideration include landing operations vs. airdrop 
options; load capacity of the aircraft; and required cargo capabilities just to name a few. 
7.  Phase IV: Organization 
Team organizes, trains and equips resistance cadre.  Emphasis is on 
developing infrastructure.28 
The allies focus was not on the initial organization of the resistance, which had 
already formed in Yugoslavia.  Rather, the focus was on the link between the resistance 
and the allies to coordinate logistic requests and establish the drop zones (DZ) so supplies 
could be brought into Yugoslavia.  The results of this organization will be highlighted in 
Phase VI, combat employment.     
Phase IV is predominantly a building phase of the resistance movement.  The 
teams infiltrated in Phase III establish contact with the resistance and begin forming them 
into a stronger organization.  These teams should include air advisors and/or airmen who 
are capable of employing airpower, such as the joint terminal attack controllers.  These 
airmen are the conduit between the ground forces and the airmen flying overhead.  The 
infiltrated teams need periodic resupply of materials.  The teams plan for additional air 
missions by confirming DZs and landing zones; establishing the role attack aircraft will 
provide; mobility to reach outlying groups or rapid movement to bring forces (leaders) 
together.  Developing strong communications networks in this phase assists with the 
development and growth of the insurgency (Phase V) and actual combat operations 
during Phase VI. 
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8.  Phase V: Buildup 
Team assists cadre with expansion into an effective resistance 
organization.  Limited combat operations may be conducted but 
emphasis remains on development.29 
From the Allies perspective, the resistance served two purposes.  First, by its mere 
existence, the resistance created a need for more Axis troops to pacify the country—the 
more troops (even second rate) left in Yugoslavia, the fewer troops on the front lines in 
Africa, Russia, and occupied Europe. The second purpose was to inflict as much damage 
upon the Axis forces as possible.  Desirable action included assassinations, demolitions, 
work stoppages, and sabotage of war related material.   Encouraging additional resistance 
movements and raising the morale of the occupied population were additional objectives.   
Despite the allied agents and aid flowing into Yugoslavia, the Cetnici failed to 
create a significant impact as a resistance organization.  Mihalovic refused to attack the 
Axis powers unless his Cetnici forces had a distinct tactical advantage, which never 
seemed to materialize.  The Partisans attacked more frequently than the Cetnici, which 
caused a brutally harsh reprisal by the Nazis:  for every Axis soldier killed, 100 civilians 
would be killed, and for every Axis soldier wounded, 50 civilians would be killed.30  In 
order to avoid civilian deaths, the Cetnici ceased insurgent activity and began to openly 
collaborate with Axis forces. Further political discord between the royalists and the 
communists existed until November 1941, when the Cetnici directly attacked the 
Partisans.  Once the Cetnici were exposed as true collaborators with the Axis forces, all 
allied personnel and the supply effort shifted to supporting Tito’s Partisan units.31    
Airpower during Phase V supports the growth of the resistance movement.  This 
can be in the form of continued PYSOP application; mobility assets transport members to 
training and meeting sites as well as provide the necessary supplies (food, water, 
clothing, arms, munitions, etc) to sustain the growing militia.  The size of the movement 
will determine the amount of supplies needed and the frequency of required resupply.  
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Additional requirements for airlift develop as forces require transportation closer to the 
battlefield area or need to evacuate sick or wounded resistance fighters from the area.  
The Partisans used airlift to evacuate sick and wounded members to hospitals in Italy, 
permitting the guerilla force to focus on fighting rather than caring for their infirm.32     
9.  Phase VI: Combat Employment 
UW forces conduct combat operations until linkup with conventional 
forces or end of hostilities.33 
In July 1941, Hitler made the strategic decision to invade the Soviet Union.  The 
Nazis used their forces from Yugoslavia for the invasion of Russia, leaving a primarily 
Italian occupation force in Yugoslavia.  Tito used this opportunity to expand his 
operations and further engage the remaining Axis forces.  The Partisans enjoyed minor 
success early in the campaign by capturing the city of Uzice and holding it for several 
weeks.  The Partisans were eventually driven out by a combined German and Cetnici 
force.34   
It took nearly 600,000 Axis forces to occupy the country and ensure supply routes 
were maintained to Greece and North Africa.  By the end of 1942, the Partisans had 
expanded to 150,000 troops, organized into two corps, three divisions, and thirty-one 
brigades.35  Due to the size and the growth of the Partisan force, the Axis forces launched 
several offensives to crush the Partisans.  The Partisans were able to out maneuver and 
avoid these large-scale frontal confrontations by dividing and hiding in the mountains.   
Meanwhile, Italian forces were suffering setbacks on multiple fronts, including 
the invasion of Sicily in July 1943.  At the same time, the Partisans pressured the 
occupying Italians in Yugoslavia, which forced Mussolini to remove his forces.  With 
captured and abandoned Italian arms, Tito successfully armed eight corps and twenty-six 
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divisions (estimates range from 220,000 to nearly 300,000 men).36  Following the Italian 
Army’s departure, the Germans had to fill the void, and rushed additional forces to 
Yugoslavia in order to retain control.  German expansion was finally reversed as North 
Africa and Italy fell to the Allies, and the Russians advanced in the East. 
Once the resistance engages in combat operations, the need for ISR, 
mobility/infil/exfil (around the battlefield as well as resupply) and attack assets will 
increase.  The ISR occurs throughout the operation, feeding information regarding troop 
movements and passing targeting information to both ground and air assets.  Mobility is 
used to ensure the resistance maintains the necessary supplies and arms to conduct 
operations.  A distinct advantage is the ability to rapidly shift forces around the battlefield 
in order to exploit enemy weaknesses or holes.  Finally, attack assets provide additional 
firepower that the resistance would not normally be able to access.  Tito’s Partisans 
occasionally enjoyed allied air support during major offensive operations.  Once airfields 
in Italy were secured, the allies coordinated with imbedded agents to provide air cover 
during large Partisan operations.  These missions lacked the close coordination required 
to make them extremely effective, although they were able to keep the Luftwaffe from 
attacking the Partisans.  As was seen in the opening months of Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), American Special Operations Forces (SOF) embedded with the 
Northern Alliance quickly defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan 
through the use of precision firepower deployed by the U.S. Air Force.37    
10.  Phase VII: Demobilization 
UW forces revert to national control, shifting to regular forces or 
demobilizing.38 
The UW in Yugoslavia was multifaceted and complicated by Yugoslavian 
politics.  The Allies’ strategic goal was to defeat the Axis powers.  The Partisans saw the 
conflict as an opportunity to gain control of the country once the occupation forces were 
removed.  For the Cetnici, it was a struggle to overthrow the occupation forces and an 
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opportunity to defeat the political opposition—the communists.  Mihalovic played a 
dangerous political game and allied himself with whoever appeared to be wining at the 
time between the Axis and the Allies.  The Partisans exposed the Cetnici as forces aiding 
the Axis, and the Yugoslav government in exile removed Mihalovic as Chief of the 
Yugoslav Army and replaced him with Tito.  After Yugoslavia was liberated, the royal 
government returned to power and the Partisans were reorganized as the official army of 
Yugoslavia. 
Once the insurgency has developed into an organization that is large enough to 
challenge the power structure, a shift from guerilla warfare to more conventional means 
of combat occurs.  This transformation must occur to legitimize the insurgents as the new 
power structure that will occupy the government positions of power.  The guerilla force 
now transitioned into the standing military and police force of this newly established 
government. The Partisans did not disburse; rather they remained under arms and formed 
the new Yugoslav Army.  Airpower permits the new government to control territory 
through rapid movement of officials and the ability to bring needed supplies and material 
into regions that need infrastructure repair.  Airpower also provides a means to control 
borders and ensure state sovereignty.     
11.  The Influence Airpower in Yugoslavia 
a.  Assets and Organization 
In October 1943, the Joint Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Middle East 
Forces, emphasized re-supplying the Partisans from their newly acquired bases in Italy.  
Tito’s forces now confronted seventeen German divisions and eight Bulgarian divisions 
within Yugoslavia.39 The Allies thought if the Partisan forces could increase their 
pressure in Yugoslavia, more German divisions might be diverted from the Russian and 
Italian fronts.  Tito’s Partisan force had grown into a significant army that still waged a 
guerilla campaign exploiting hit-and-run tactics and utilizing the mountains as secure 
bases.  His army desperately needed supplies and up until this time had relied primarily 
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on captured Axis equipment.  The list of supplies needed by the Partisan’s included: 
arms, from pistols to Sten guns to light artillery; munitions, explosives, demolition 
equipment, incendiaries, and sabotage devices; medical supplies such as bandages, litters, 
drugs and instruments; signal equipment such as small radios; food and clothing; money; 
and even mules.40 
The British, American, Polish, South African, Italian and Russian air 
forces all supported the special aerial operations in the Mediterranean Theater.  The 
British aerial supply of the Partisans began in May 1942, with a flight of four Liberators.  
The demand for supplies far exceeded the capabilities of these aircraft and in March 
1943, 14 Halifaxes were brought in to assist with resupply.41   These planes were initially 
based out of Tocra, Libya.   In November 1943, the Americans supplied three B-17s and 
seven B-25s for the special operations mission.  The Polish Air Force also arrived in 
North Africa with four Halifaxes and two Liberators dedicated for resupply missions.  
Following the Allied advance in Italy, and the Italians switch to the Allied side, new 
airfields closer to the Balkans were available from which to base operations.  The Royal 
Air Force (RAF) formed the 334 Wing to support special operations missions in the 
Balkans.  This multinational wing included: 
RAF: 36 Halifaxes 
Polish Air Force: 8 Halifaxes 
Soviet air group: 12 C-47s 
Italian Air Force: 36 Cant-1007-Zs and SM-82s 
Army Air Corps: 24 C-47s; 7 B-25’s and 3 B-17s42 
The Allied air effort to supply Tito’s Partisan Army expanded into the 
Balkan Air Force by December 1944.  In addition to the special operations wing, the 
Balkan Air Force also included 21 fighter squadrons, eight medium bomber squadrons 
and two heavy bomber squadrons.43  The creation of the Balkan Air Force provided a 
significant boost to the Partisans.  First, the aircraft dropping supplies could now be 
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escorted into Yugoslavia by fighter aircraft rather than facing the Luftwaffe alone.  
Second, the bomber and ground attack aircraft provided an aerial offensive capability that 
enabled the Partisans to take more conventional approaches to operations.  In order to 
successfully coordinate these offensive air operations with Partisan action, Allied agents 
had to infiltrate Yugoslavia and link up with Partisan forces.     
b.   Aircraft Modifications 
The Army Air Corps had to make minor modifications to their aircraft in 
order to perform the special missions into Yugoslavia: 
The nose of the C-47 was enlarged slightly to provide greater room in the 
pilot’s compartment, and occasionally special floors and bracing were 
installed to take care of certain types of cargo.  Few other changes were 
required of the C-47s beyond fitting them with racks to hold containers 
and the installation of “Rebecca” equipment.  The Rebecca set is a radar 
directional air-ground device which records radar impulses on a grid and 
directs the navigator toward the ground operator.  By varying the intensity 
or frequency of the “blips,” the ground operator, whose set is called 
“Eureka,” can transmit signal letters to the aircraft….Shortage of 
Rebecca/Eureka sets limited the use of this equipment in the 
Mediterranean theater, but by December 1944, practically all special 
operations aircraft had Rebecca.44 
The Rebecca/Eureka equipment enabled night precision airdrops without 
having to fly over a drop zone to confirm it, then circle back to perform the airdrop.  
The heavy bombers used as special operations aircraft had more radical 
modifications.  The ball turret on B-17s and B-24s were replaced by a cargo hatch 
through which packages (or personnel) were dropped.   Jump lights, handrails, and jump 
panels were also installed.  Equipment that was required for bombing only was removed.  
A monorail and roller-mounted safety belt were installed in the rear fuselage.  Blackout 
curtains were installed over the waist-gun windows, blisters for the pilot’s and co-pilot’s  
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windows provided greater visibility, modification of bomb bays to fit British containers, 
separate compartments for the bombardier and navigator, and finally the planes were 
painted a shiny black.45   
c.  Aircrew Training   
Additional training was required for both the C-47 and bomber aircrews.  
The Army Air Corps C-47 aircrew required little additional training.  They received 
specialized training in the operation of the specialized navigation equipment known by its 
codenames: “Rebecca” and ”Eureka.” The Eureka device was a small transmitter that 
agents on the ground behind enemy lines (the Jedburgh teams in Europe or the agents 
aiding the Partisans) would use to mark drop zones.  The field agent would set the Eureka 
with a specific code at the drop zone while the inbound resupply aircraft used the 
Rebecca equipment to decipher the code and hone in on the drop zone location.  This 
transmitter device enabled more accurate night airdrops and limited the exposure of the 
aircrew to hostile threats.  The aircraft that did not have the Rebecca equipment flew over 
the drop zone once to verify the correct zone, then circle back to make the drop, 
increasing the possibility of compromising both the ground party and exposing the crew 
to additional enemy action. They also spent extra time developing accuracy in low 
altitude, slow speed airdrops.  The heavy bomber crews spent time learning how to 
handle the bombers at near stall speeds for airdrop and resupply missions.  They also 
focused on flying both day and night operations. All special operations aircrew received 
additional ground training (lectures) in security, flying control, standard operating 
procedures, ditching, air-sea rescue, flak intelligence, escape and evasion, and how to 
plan supply missions.  Radio operators and navigators also received additional training in 
their specialties.46     
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d.  Planning Supply Missions 
The Office of Special Services (OSS) prepared a monthly statement on the 
estimated number of sorties required to deliver the supplies.  OSS field agents (imbedded 
with the Partisans) would submit requests for supplies based on Partisan plans for future 
operations.  The number of sorties requested was based on the load-carrying capacity of 
the Halifax bomber.  These requests were submitted to the Special Operations Section, G-
3 at Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ).  The G-3 reviewed, screened and consolidated 
requests as required and then sent it to the Mediterranean Air Force.  This headquarters 
determined the total number of sorties and the available aircraft.  If the request exceeded 
the capability of the force, the Special Operations Committee, which consisted of the 
American State Department, British Foreign Office, special agencies, Mediterranean Air 
Force, Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G-2 and G-3 AFHQ would consider 
political, tactical, strategic and economic considerations to determine the final sortie 
allocation.  The sorties were allocated once a decision was reached and the squadrons 
were tasked with specific missions.  The squadron commanders were given the flexibility 
to spread the requests out over the month.  This mission flexibility permitted surging 
forces to take advantage of favorable weather, maintenance or tactical needs, while 
decreasing workloads in times of unfavorable conditions.47   
On average, a single C-47 would drop supplies to 15 targets per mission.  
The standard tactic was to have between one and three C-47s provide a supply drop per 
target.  Ideally, no more than four C-47s would drop at the same drop zone.  The tactical 
importance, weight of the cargo requested and the degree of darkness would determine 
the number of planes involved in a single drop.  When a mission was scheduled, the 
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) would broadcast a special code, which notified the 
agents in country of the number of planes and expected targets.48 
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e.  Reception Committee 
The aircrew and the reception committee ensured that the supplies reached 
Partisan hands.   The reception committee was staffed by an Allied liaison officer, a small 
number of troops and Partisans.  These committees controlled all of the DZs in 
Yugoslavia.  The liaison officer served as the conduit between the OSS and the Partisans.  
His duties included passing along Partisan requests for supplies as well as ensuring drop 
zones were clear of enemy forces.  They also would light signal flares or lay out marking 
panels to mark the DZ, and arranged for the recovery of the supplies once dropped.49  In 
the Balkans, nearly every DZ was located in the mountains.  The special operations pilots 
were trained to drop their cargo from 600 feet above the ground, which put them three to 
five thousand feet below the peaks.50  The most dangerous part of the mission was not 
facing the enemy, but flying low and slow in sometimes uncharted mountainous terrain.     
Not all supplies were air dropped.  As the Partisan strength grew, they 
were able to secure semi-permanent airstrips for significant amounts of time.51  Larger 
quantities of supplies could be easily delivered when the aircrew would land to offload 
the cargo.  The advantage of the C-47 was in its rugged design.  It could withstand 
landing on dirt fields that the Partisans carved out of the countryside.        
12. UW Summary 
Each UW campaign is unique due to political, economic, military, social, and 
geographical reasons.  Therefore, the roles and missions that airpower provides in support 
of each campaign must be specific to each situation and require creative adaptation of 
assets.  This analysis described how airpower can influence each phase of the UW 
campaign.  The list of missions described below should not be taken as a complete list, 
but rather a sample of potential uses of airpower within each phase of an UW campaign.  
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Final determination for how to employ airpower in a given situation must be made whilst 
considering all of the unique characteristics of the particular UW situation at hand.        
The following is a list of the general missions that airpower provides in support of 
the UW campaign:    
1. Intelligence gathering, including persistent ISR (the unblinking eye) 
2. Information operations  
a. PYSOPs 
b. Exploitation of media sources 
3. Precision attack 
a. Close Air Support (CAS) 
b. Interdiction  
4. Mobility / Transportation  
a. Medical 
b. Battlefield mobility 
c. Supply / Logistics 
5. Air superiority 
6. Building insurgent air capability (if necessary) 
7. Command and Control 
These missions are not listed in any particular order, as their importance shifts depending 
on what Phase of the UW campaign is being worked.  
In UW, the resistance movement or insurgent forces are usually weaker in size 
and capability than the occupying or government forces.  In these situations, the 
capability of the resistance to exploit the advantages airpower brings to the fight may be 
enough to achieve victory.   
In the Balkans, Tito’s forces were harassed and Partisan operations were 
hampered by German airpower.  Once the Balkan Air Force was established, the 21 
fighter squadrons swept the Axis air force from the sky and permitted the Partisans to 
engage in offensive operations supported by eight medium and two heavy bomber 
squadrons.52  Under the cover of airpower, the Partisan’s combat effectiveness grew from 
minor harassment of Axis forces to gaining and holding territory.  Predominantly, the 
Balkan Air Force used offensive capabilities to protect the mobility transports from Axis 
fighters while on their resupply missions.  Occasionally, the Partisans coordinated for air 
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support in conjunction with major offensive action.  Very limited close air support was 
used due to the required coordination between air and ground assets.  Instead, airpower 
concentrated on keeping the Luftwaffe out of the battle and interdicting the Axis 
reinforcements prior to battle. 
The organizational structure of the Balkans Air Force was a traditional, combined 
composite wing.  The aircraft that were primarily responsible for the resupply of the 
Partisans were normal aircraft found in the Army Air Corps.  However, the aircraft went 
through modifications to permit their use to perform the unique missions associated with 
supplying the Partisans and infiltration of agents.   
B. COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) 
1.  Background 
COIN is designed to aid a legitimate government in retaining power through 
defeating the insurgent or resistance movement that threatens its existence.  The focus is 
on civil and military action working together to achieve the desired end state.  The civil 
action can be divided further between social, political and economic spheres.  The U.S. 
government further describes COIN as activity that:  
…integrates and synchronizes political, security, economic, and 
informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and 
effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population.  
COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the 
population from insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity 
of government institutions to govern responsibly and marginalize 
insurgents politically, socially and economically.53  
The COIN case study presented here will explore the role airpower plays in the defense 
of the legitimate, Royal Laotian government.  Having gained independence in 1954, the 
Royal Laotian government immediately was attacked by communist insurgents.  The U.S. 
government came to the assistance of the Royal Laotian government, providing a bulk of 
assistance through airpower.  For the purpose of this paper, the success or failure of the 
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Laotian government to properly use the military, social, political and economic aspects is 
not important.  The key point is the role and impact airpower played in supporting the 
Laotian military and preventing the communist takeover until U.S. forces were 
withdrawn in 1975.     
2.  Framework 
Despite the Air Force’s conventional and technological focus in Vietnam, it also 
supported the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the secret war in Laos, combating 
the Pathet Lao (communist insurgents) and conventional North Vietnamese army units.  
The focus of COIN is the successful defeat of an insurgency.  As with UW, each 
insurgency operates under its own unique conditions.  Therefore, it is critical for the 
government to identify what conditions have given rise to the insurgency and move to 
counteract that particular condition.  The desired end state of a COIN operation is to 
establish control over the environment—to ensure the will of the people support the 
government and not the insurgency.  The government must provide capacity building and 
reform the issues that enabled the insurgency to develop in the first place.  Therefore, the 
three components that develop the political strategy are information, economic 
development, and security, as depicted in Figure 3.  Airpower can play an important role 
in all three of these components.  In the case of Laos, airpower provided limited 
information/intelligence gathering, while concentrating primarily on security.  
Unfortunately, by ignoring the political, social and economic aspects, the overall political 




Figure 3.   U.S. Government Comprehensive Approach to Counterinsurgency54 
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3. COIN in Laos 
Following World War II, France attempted to re-establish its colonial power over 
Indochina.  By 1946, Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh made a bid for independence in Vietnam 
by attacking the French forces stationed in Vietnam.  The conflict quickly spilled over 
into neighboring Laos.  The border region between Vietnam and Laos had been 
traditionally contentious, and as the nations in Indochina vied for independence, this 
border region dispute became an issue again.55  In 1947, the French made the Kingdom 
of Laos a constitutional independent state within the French Union.  Laotian separatists 
formed a communist government under the name Pathet Lao.  The Pathet Lao allied 
themselves with the Viet Minh (permitting the latter to operate inside sovereign Laotian 
territory) to completely remove French influence from Laos and Vietnam.  The Geneva 
Conference of 1954 secured the independence of French Indochina and recognized 
democratic governments in Laos and South Vietnam.56  With French influence ousted 
from Indochina, the communist Viet Minh turned their attention to the border between 
North Vietnam and Laos.  Throughout the late 1950s, the North Vietnamese attempted 
several infiltrations into Laos, in conjunction with the Pathet Lao forces. Thus, the North 
Vietnamese could not be accused of invading Laos.  In addition to aiding the Pathet Lao, 
the North Vietnamese established a supply route, popularly known as the Ho Chi Minh 
Trail, that cut south (in Laos) from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.  This supply route 
provided the Viet Cong (South Vietnamese communist guerillas) with desperately needed 
supplies for their war against South Vietnam.   
While the communist forces were moving through Southeast Asia, the U.S. 
focused on countering the main communist threat, the Soviet Union.  This drove many in 
the Air Force to desire an all-jet aircraft fleet and rely upon technologically advanced 
weapons. This caused an over-reliance and misguided beliefs in the ability of technology 
to overcome any combat situation presented.  Despite this drive for technology, the Air 
Force inventory of the 1960s included aircraft from World War II, so it had an inventory 
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that included everything from propeller driven aircraft to modern jet aircraft. The aircraft 
that were best suited for COIN in Laos were the same planes (Cessna O-1) used in 
Vietnam for forward air control, although stripped of any Air Force markings.  The strike 
aircraft were a combination of Laotian Air Force (T-28) and U.S. Air Force (A-1, AC-
47/119/130, B-52, C-123/130, CH-3/34, F-4/105) assets.  
4.  Early Intervention 
The increased communist activity in Laos made the U.S. government aware of the 
need to focus on how to counter the communists’ insurgency.  The insurgency in Laos, 
while less organized than the insurgency in South Vietnam, had developed from the 
nationalist movement that gripped the country post World War II.   By the late 1950s, the 
insurgency had grown beyond local police control and now threatened the government of 
Laos.  In 1959, the Army deployed 107 Special Operations Forces to Laos to assist with 
the training and development of the Laotian Army.  Laos was considered a neutral 
territory between the United States and North Vietnam; therefore, the U.S. forces had to 
operate without uniforms and were only “advisors.”  This covert advisory mission to 
Laos was known by its code name, Project 404.  The purpose of this project was to train 
both the Royal Laotian Army and indigenous Hmong and Yao tribesmen to fight the 
Pathet Lao communist insurgency.    
From 1961–1962, the Laotian government officially requested United States 
military aid, which made U.S. presence in Laos “official” and the U.S. forces were 
permitted to wear their uniforms openly.57  By mid-1962, Laos officially reaffirmed their 
neutrality and the U.S. forces in Laos once again were forced to operate covertly.  By this 
time, the communist insurgents had increased in size to the point they moved from 
guerilla warfare to more conventional methods of combat.  These conventional 
capabilities were augmented by the North Vietnamese military incursions into northern 
Laos.  With Laotian neutrality officially declared, overt U.S. military action was 
undesirable as it could widen the conflict in Indochina and invoke further communist 
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aggression.  Therefore, the responsibility of conducting a secret war was passed to the 
CIA, which operated directly for the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan.  The 
CIA used both proprietary airlines, Civil Air Transport (CAT) and Air America, in their 
secret war in Laos.58  These aircraft were used to resupply and transport forces, and for 
rudimentary intelligence gathering.  At the height of the “secret war in Laos,” the Agency 
only had 225 personnel, which included 50 case officers in Laos.59 
The CIA airline, Air America, provided resupply airdrops for General Pao’s 
forces as well as the regular Laotian Army.  Air America assets also shuttled the Laotian 
Air Force trainees to Thailand to attend pilot training, and brought them back to their 
bases in Laos.  Additionally, the helicopters of Air America provided critical battlefield 
mobility for General Pao’s Commando forces.  Regular Army units engaged the Pathet 
Lao or North Vietnamese regulars while Pao held his commandos in reserve.  As needed, 
he sent his forces on helicopters to shore up Laotian Army lines that were on the verge of 
collapse.  He also sent his commandos to expand a breech in enemy lines.   The Air 
America helicopters provided rescue services for Pao’s commandos as well as the U.S. 
Air Force pilots shot down bombing the Ho Chi Minh Trail, or the forward air controllers 
who had crash-landed from engine failure or enemy action. 
As the Pathet Lao gained strength, men and supplies flowed into Laos from North 
Vietnam.  The Royal Laotian Army needed additional firepower and military assistance 
to repel the combined Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces.  Airpower offered the 
combat edge that could tip the scales in favor of the Laotian government.   Airpower 
provided not only firepower, but reconnaissance capabilities and mobility support.  The 
American solution was to provide the rugged T-28 aircraft to the Royal Laotian Air 
Force.60  These were originally designed as training aircraft.  It was easy to teach Laotian 
Air Force members to fly and maintain the T-28.  Simple modifications added bomb 
racks, capable of holding bombs or rockets, to the undercarriage.  These simple 
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modifications made the former training aircraft an excellent light attack plane, providing 
the Royal Laotian Air Force with a multi-purpose aircraft that flew both close air support 
and interdiction missions in addition to aerial reconnaissance missions.       
In 1964, the U.S. Air Force received authorization for mid- and low-level flights 
over Laos to perform reconnaissance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and to assess the 
infiltration routes of men and material from North Vietnam into South Vietnam.  These 
missions were flown under the code name Yankee Team.61  The United States President 
or the Ambassador to Laos personally authorized fighter-bomber aircraft to bomb 
sections of the Ho Chi Minh Trail that traversed southern Laos as well as to conduct 
retaliatory bombing strikes against known concentrations of North Vietnamese forces 
inside Laos.62  Overtly, the U.S. government denied dropping bombs in Laos, as it was a 
neutral nation.  In reality, the Laotian government requested and received U.S. Air Force 
bomber support to interdict communist positions throughout the country.  The Yankee 
Team missions provided critical battlefield intelligence of the communist logistics trail 
that feed the Viet Cong in South Vietnam as well as the North Vietnamese Army 
incursions into northern Laos.  The Air Force used a low and slow propeller aircraft (O-1) 
to identify targets for the jet fighter-bomber aircraft.  The O-1 was piloted by a Forward 
Air Controller (FAC) who would often fly low enough he could visually identify his 
targets, he would then circle back and mark the position with a smoke rocket.  The FAC 
directed the fighter-bombers to deploy their ordinance in relation to his marking smoke.  
The Air Force selected FACs for the secret war in Laos from combat-proven FACs flying 
in South Vietnam.                     
5.  Airpower 
a.  Assets and Organization 
In 1961, to address these wars of liberation, the Air Force Chief of Staff, 
General Curtis LeMay, created the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) at 
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Hurlburt Field, Florida with the mission of counterinsurgency training and combat 
operations.  During the Cold War, the Soviet Union confronted the U.S. militarily 
through “wars of liberation.”  In 1961, to address the Soviet threat, the Air Force Chief of 
Staff, General Curtis LeMay, created the 4400th CCTS at Hurlburt Field, Florida with the 
mission of counterinsurgency training and combat operations.   These airmen, known as 
Air Commandos, focused on development of foreign internal defense tactics and 
techniques for building counterinsurgency capabilities in Third World nations.  Squadron 
aircraft included the U-10, C-46, C-47, B-26 and AT-28.  In November 1961, a 
detachment of the 4400th deployed to Vietnam on Operation FARMGATE and flew 
combat missions.  The squadron expanded into a group in March 1962.  In April, the U.S. 
Air Force Special Air Warfare Center was established at Eglin AFB, Florida.  The 
Special Air Warfare Center continued to acquire additional aircraft and by the mid 1960s 
the fleet included O-1, O-2, A-26, A-37, A-1, C-123 and C-130 aircraft, as well as 
several types of helicopters.63  The Air Force’s special operations capability continued to 
grow as involvement in Vietnam increased.     
Air Commandos secretly entered Laos and began the Butterfly Program.  
This program included the employment of Air Force Combat Control Teams (CCT)to 
direct tactical air strikes as well as train Laotian pilots to perform FAC duties.  Due to the 
difficulty and hazardous nature of forward air control, the Americans resorted to flying 
the mission while a Laotian “spotter” coordinated with friendly ground units and 
identified enemy positions.  This program eventually gave way to the Steve Canyon 
Program, which formalized the process for bringing U.S. Air Force FACs into Laos from 
Vietnam.64   
The Steve Canyon Program was the cover name for the FAC missions in 
Laos.  At the midpoint of their tour in Vietnam, a FAC was briefed about a highly 
classified program that he could volunteer for, or he could continue his last six months in 
Vietnam and return home.  After volunteering for the program, he was reassigned to 
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Udorn Air Force Base, Thailand.  There, he would shed his Air Force uniform and report 
to a hanger in civilian attire.  An Air America plane (airline of the CIA) transported the 
volunteers to the new assignment.  The airmen reported into the air attaché’s office at the 
U.S. Embassy in Vientiane, Laos.  Here they were given U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) identification cards and told that “officially” they were forest 
rangers attached to USAID.65  Over the course of the Steve Canyon Program, the U.S. 
Air Force had no more than 22 FACs in Laos at any given time.66  Beyond the small 
numbers of airmen making such a huge impact on combat operations, it reduced U.S. 
costs, as Senator Stuart Symington was quoted as saying “…the CIA in Laos was 
spending in a year what the U.S. Army was spending in a day in Vietnam.”67          
The Royal Laotian Air Force was small, with a limited number of AT-6 
and T-28 aircraft.  The United States enhanced this tiny air force through the Steve 
Canyon Program FACs.  These FACs, known by their radio call sign Raven, enjoyed 
relative freedom of action as they operated under a convoluted chain of command.  
Officially (according to the U.S. Air Force) they were assigned to the 56th Special 
Operations Wing based at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand with records and pay being handled 
by Detachment 1 at Udorn.  Operationally, they were “on loan” to the air attaché in 
Vientiane, Laos and therefore fell under the control of the ambassador.  Once they 
reached their airfields in Laos, they fell under direct control of the CIA and native 
generals.  The Ravens enjoyed this command structure as it permitted them to play 
agencies off one another as necessary in order to achieve the greatest tactical success. 68     
b.   Aircraft Modifications 
Initially, the Royal Laotian Air Force received six AT-6 aircraft from the 
United States in 1961.  These aircraft were modified training aircraft with machine guns, 
and equipped to fire rockets and drop bombs.  The American advisors determined the 
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best option for the Laotian Air Force to be trainer aircraft.  These aircraft were easier to 
fly and more forgiving in case of pilot error.  They had excellent visibility from the 
cockpit, which aided in the dual role of the aircraft as a reconnaissance aircraft as well as 
a light attack plane.  In late 1963, the Royal Air Force accepted four T-28 aircraft.  These 
aircraft also were modified with machine guns, rocket pods and bomb racks.69   
In May 1964, the United States Embassy released the bomb fuses, which 
permitted the Royal Air Force to begin bombing the communist forces.70  Ideally, the 
embassy wanted the Royal Air Force to use both the AT-6 and T-28 as reconnaissance 
aircraft, perform FAC duties and attack missions.  However, the complexity of these 
missions exceeded the capabilities of the Laotian pilots, so the American pilots had to fly 
the forward air control missions with Laotian spotters.  Eventually, the forward air 
controllers used O-1 and U-17 (Cessna 185) spotter aircraft and the occasional T-28 to 
mark targets.71  The only other modification that the aircraft received was during the 
transfer from the United States Air Force to the Laotian Air Force.  The planes were 
flown to Thailand, where they were stripped of all Air Force and unit markings.  Only the 
tail number remained.  An Air Force representative, usually a colonel, would “sell” the 
aircraft to a Steve Canyon Program pilot for a dollar; have him sign a sheet that stated the 
aircraft was sold as military surplus to a private pilot.72 The pilot then received a 
classified flight plan and transferred the airplane to secret bases inside Laos.         
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c.  Aircrew Training   
The CIA operated in Laos from 1961, secretly recruiting, arming and 
training Hmong tribesman as a counter-insurgency force.73  “Under the control of the 
CIA, the Special Forces (SF) were able to engage in operations exploiting their unique 
capability of organizing guerilla-type units to fit against the adversary.”74  In 1962, 
several hundred Laotian tribesmen were sent to Thailand to train at secret bases as 
commandos.  The tribesmen adapted well to the ground commando warfare.  They did 
however, struggle with technological skills taught in flight school.  By 1964, the Laotian 
government recognized the advantage airpower provided to combat operations and 
formally requested that the United States provide assistance to the Royal Laotian Air 
Force through training programs.  On April 1, 41 airmen from Detachment 6, 1st Air 
Commando Wing established Operation WATERPUMP at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force 
Base to train Laotian pilots.75  Besides training Laotian pilots, this program provided an 
avenue for Thai pilots to volunteer to fly for the Royal Laotian Air Force, similar to the 
Eagle Squadrons of Americans who flew for the British Royal Air Force (RAF) in World 
War II.   The secondary mission of the airmen was to provide emergency air cover for 
friendly forces (forward air controllers) in case of a renewed Communist offensive.          
d.  Forward Air Control and Reconnaissance 
Similar to Vietnam, Laos was divided into several military regions.  
Ravens were assigned to each region, with the most desired spot being a secret airfield at 
Long Tieng.  This was the headquarters of General Vang Pao, who led the Hmong 
Special Guerilla Units that had been trained by the U.S. Special Forces in Laos and 
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Thailand.  General Pao was the most successful Laotian general on the battlefield, 
preventing the communist forces from taking over Laos.  His units were the most capable 
fighters and he had a firm grasp of what airpower could provide to his forces.76  Each 
night, the case officers from the CIA would join the senior Raven and General Pao for 
dinner.  Following dinner, the General would lead the planning for the following days’ 
operations.77   
The American advisors in Laos found it more expedient to provided aerial 
resupply and battlefield mobility with the CIA aircraft from Air America than wait for the 
Laotian Air Force to develop those capabilities.  Both the Air America pilots and the 
Ravens provided aerial reconnaissance capabilities ranging from reconnoitering enemy 
positions to bomb damage assessment following air strikes.  The Ravens marked targets 
and directed air assets from the Royal Laotian Air Force as well as the U.S. Air Force to 
support ground operations.  The Ravens controlled assets ranging from the Laotian AT-6s 
and T-28s to the U.S. Air Force AC-47s, fighter-bombers and even the B-52.78   
Each year following the rainy season, the North Vietnamese invaded Laos 
and pushed towards the Plain of Jars.   Pao’s forces halted the advance and pushed the 
communists back in what seemed to be a never-ending tug of war.  In 1969, the Laotians 
were to have one and a half times the total number of air sorties dedicated to Vietnam.  
The deluge of airpower was designed to liberate the Plain of Jars and provide Pao with 
confidence that with airpower, he would be successful.  Unfortunately, Pao’s ground 
forces failed to secure the area once the communists were routed by airpower.  The 
communists were able to re-infiltrate the area and the Air Force bombed the same targets 
day after day.79   
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Figure 4.   Laos Military Regions (MR) During 1966–73.80  
The Ravens provided forward air control, but more importantly, they 
provided critical intelligence gathering capabilities.  The pilots quickly became familiar 
with the region they were assigned.  They flew with a Hmong observer (volunteer from 
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the Laotian Army) as a backseater or “spotter.”  These liaisons provided translation 
services when communicating with Laotian ground units and could also provide 
information on the villages they were flying over.  They understood the ground situation 
better than anyone else, and could help identify enemy and friendly troop concentrations 
or patrols.81  Figure 4 depicts the Military Regions the Ravens were assigned.  The inset 
shows the Plains of Jar, the operational area dominated by General Vang Pao’s 
commandos.      
6.   COIN Summary 
Like UW, each COIN campaign is unique.  The factors of political, economic, 
military, social and geography also impact COIN.  Therefore, the roles and missions that 
airpower provides in support of each campaign are tailored specifically to meet each 
situation and require creative adaptation of assets to fill unique missions.  This analysis 
focused on how U.S. airpower assisted militarily in a COIN campaign.  The list of 
missions described below should not be taken as a complete list, but rather a sample of 
potential uses of airpower in COIN.  The host nation government must attack the 
insurgency through all sources of power, including economic, social and political.  
Reliance upon only the military is dangerous, as the Laotians discovered when the 
communists’ forces took control of the country in December 1975.82   
Airpower provided critical battlefield advantages to the Laotian forces and 
ensured Pao’s commandos had the edge in firepower.  However, this edge was dulled 
when the Laotian government failed to address the economic, political, and social aspects 
of the insurgency as well as the military threat.  In addition to that, the U.S. government 
faced rising anti-war sentiment in America, and a deteriorating situation throughout 
Southeast Asia, leading to the complete withdrawal of forces.      
The following is a list of the general missions that airpower provides in support of 
the COIN campaign:    
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1. Intelligence gathering, including persistent ISR (the unblinking eye) 
2. Information operations  
a. PYSOPs 
b. Exploitation of media sources 
3. Precision attack 
a. Close Air Support (CAS) 
b. Interdiction  
4. Mobility / Transportation  
a. Medical 
b. Battlefield mobility 
c. Supply / Logistics 
As with UW, the importance of these missions is dependent upon the current situation.  
Over time, each one will rise or fall in level of importance and thus receiving varying 
levels of attention, however each one has role to play in the successful completion of a 
COIN operation.   
Offensive airpower in Laos controlled the battlefield.  The use of FACs to control 
airstrikes against concentrations of communist forces enabled the outnumbered Hmong 
tribesman to thwart the communist advances.  General Vang Pao, “had become an early 
and zealous convert to airpower…”83  Vang Pao even wished for an entire squadron of 
attack T-28s with native Hmong pilots.  Unfortunately, attrition through the training 
pipeline coupled with combat losses prevented the Royal Laotian Air Force from ever 
sustaining any appreciable growth in their pilot corps. 
The organizational structure of the Air Force in Laos was unclear.  Due to the 
secret nature of the mission, the airmen were assigned to Thailand bases and attached to 
the air attaché in Laos.  Once at their operating location, they worked directly with the 
CIA and Lao military.  This arrangement permitted great latitude to operate and 
maximized airpower’s ability to halt communist military advances.  As proven in Laos, 
failing to address the civil, economic and political situations in addition to the military 
action that gave rise to the insurgency will ultimately doom the COIN campaign.      
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III. CURRENT AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 
CAPABILITIES  
A.  PRECISION AIRPOWER 
The irregular warfare (IW) case studies demonstrate a need for airpower to be 
used in missions supporting one of the following broadly defined roles of attack, 
mobility, or reconnaissance.  One critical aspect of the application of airpower is 
precision capability.  Modern technology has developed to the point airpower can 
delivery munitions or supplies with pinpoint accuracy.  This accuracy is just as critical to 
IW campaigns as it is to conventional campaigns.  Some may even argue precision in IW 
is even more critical. 
Attack aircraft of today have a wide range of precision capabilities to employ 
munitions with impressive accuracy.  In counterinsurgency (COIN), it is critically 
important to limit collateral damage.  One example of a COIN strategy that relied on 
technology (airpower and artillery) but failed to comprehend the true nature of the 
insurgent problem is the early phases of American involvement in Vietnam.  The U.S. 
advisors provided the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) access to airpower and artillery 
to fight the communist insurgency led by the Viet Cong.  While this technology provided 
the ability to reach out with deadly accuracy, the ARVN failed to employ it judiciously.  
Rather, they indiscriminately used airpower and artillery against villages and hamlets 
suspected of supporting the insurgency.  They used it many times as a show of force for 
the South Vietnamese government.  The ARVNs indiscriminant use of American-
supplied firepower further alienated the population from the South Vietnamese 
government.  This misuse of power drove the population they were supposed to be 
protecting into the waiting arms of the Viet Cong as they sought methods to avenge their 
families.84  Thus, the government in power must ensure they are truly making an effort to 
protect the population from the conflict.  In an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign, 
the insurgents must not drive the population towards the government or occupying 
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power.  One goal of the insurgency would be to get the government to react 
indiscriminately and draw the population to the insurgency by offering and providing 
protection from the government.  Therefore, attack aircraft that can place weapons 
precisely on target and avoid unnecessary collateral damage will provide more benefit to 
the COIN fight than indiscriminant bombing.   
B.  ATTACK AIRCRAFT 
A high-performance jet flying at eight hundred knots and carrying bombs 
as its ordinance was not the most effective instrument to use against truck 
convoys that were moving at a snail’s pace down the muddy Ho Chi Minh 
Trail under triple canopy tree cover.  They could not linger long enough to 
identify their targets, and they could not aim accurately enough to destroy 
them.  What we needed was something that was slow-moving, could see a 
target, and could zero in on it and stay with it until it had destroyed it with 
Gatling guns or cannon. 
— William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Laos85 
The AC-130 gunship provides close air support (CAS), air interdiction and force 
protection.  CAS includes: troops in contact, convoy escort and urban operations.  Air 
interdiction missions are conducted against pre-planned targets or targets of opportunity.  
Force protection includes air base or facilities defense.  Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) currently has eight AC-130H gunships, which have one 40mm and 
one 105mm cannon.  AFSOC also has 17 AC-130U gunships, with one 25mm Gatling 
gun, one 40mm and one 105mm cannon.86  These side-firing weapons are integrated with 
advanced navigational equipment and sensor suite.  The sensors consist of both infrared 
and television cameras.  The AC-130U includes a synthetic aperture strike radar for all-
weather targeting capability.   
The gunship was developed to fight in the jungles of Vietnam.  Side firing 
weapons were first employed from the AC-47, a converted C-47 transport aircraft.  
Additional transport aircraft such as the C-119, C-123 and C-130 were converted to side-
firing gunships.  Light observation aircraft also carried side-firing weapons, but were 
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deemed too small to be an effective gunship.  As enemy defenses improved the gunship 
increased their self protection capabilities.  One method of protection was to fly at higher 
altitudes, above the threat envelope of the air defenses.  As the gunship flew higher, its 
sensor and weapons effectiveness decreased.  The Air Force turned to technology to 
overcome these new limitations, placing larger weapons on the gunship and developing 
new sensors.  Finally, the C-130 emerged as the aircraft that combined all the 
requirements of the Air Force for survivability, sensor and weapons effectiveness, and 
loiter time. 
The Phoenix Cycle once again took hold of the Air Force special operations 
aircraft fleet when the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam in 1975.87  All variations of the 
gunship were discarded except the C-130 version.  Some of the discarded gunships found 
homes in other nation’s air forces, such as Cambodia, Laos, South Africa, South 
Vietnam, and Thailand, all of whom maintained a version of the AC-47.  Today, only 
Columbia and El Salvador maintain their AC-47 aircraft.88  With the advanced 
technology that drives the C-130 airframe and the additional gunship specific 
modifications, the AC-130 has become too expensive for smaller nations to operate.  
Instead, the C-47 aircraft with its side firing machine guns is both affordable and 
successful for these smaller nations.     
Although not a direct attack (kinetic) platform, the EC-130J Commando Solo 
aircraft is another valuable AFSOC asset.  This aircraft conducts information operations 
(IO), psychological operations (PYSOP), civil affairs (CA) broadcasts in AM, FM, HF, 
TV, and military communications bands.89    Originally developed in the 1960’s, the 
mission of broadcasting information in support of IO, PYSOP, and CA missions has 
played a vital role in the U.S. military effort.   
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The EC-130 has been involved in modern military action as IO has taken a more 
important role in U.S. military.  The following list shows a small example of the 
operations the EC-130 has been involved in: 
Grenada (1983)  
Panama (1989) 
Desert Storm (1990–91) 
Haiti (1994) 
Bosnia–Herzegovina (1997) 
Allied Force (1999) 
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001) 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)90 
Unlike kinetic strikes that have visible indications of success or failure, the IO, PYSOPS, 
CA mission results are ambiguous and lack tangible evidence of success.  Despite the 
apparent lack of identifiable marks of success or failure, the EC-130 provides the critical 
capability to influence a population through targeted messages on radio and TV.  
Influence of the population has an important effect on the success or failure of both UW 
and COIN operations.        
C.  MOBILITY/RESUPPLY 
Airpower provides critical mobility and resupply capabilities to guerilla forces 
operating in the UW environment.  It is, perhaps, the most critical advantage of airpower.  
Rapid mobility around the battlefield ensures the commitment of reserve forces at the 
critical juncture and point of battle.  Further, as field units expend supplies, ammunition, 
food, clothing, etc., the timely replenishment of those supplies can mean the difference 
between success and failure in the campaign.     
For Tito’s Partisans, aerial resupply allowed his force to maintain fighting 
strength and vastly improved morale among his forces.  When a Partisan fighter was 
wounded, they were evacuated to Italy to receive care from Allied medical personnel.  
Initially, the Partisans had to rely on captured weapons to arm their forces.  Many of the 
Partisans weapons were acquired as the Italians withdrew forces from Yugoslavia and 
abandoned their stores.  The Balkan Air Force was able to provide supplies (especially 
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cloths and food) to the Partisans in their mountain hideouts during the winter months.  In 
other theaters during World War II, airpower also provided explosives, radios, munitions, 
food, clothing and advisors that were desperately needed to effectively harass occupation 
forces and sustain the insurgencies.  The MC-130 is AFSOC’s primary mobility aircraft 
used for: infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces and 
equipment in hostile or denied territory.  Additional MC-130 missions include: refueling 
special operations vertical lift assets, forward arming and refueling, specialized ordinance 
delivery, airdrops supporting psychological operations and limited command and control 
capabilities.91  Specialized navigation equipment permits all weather operations and the 
MC-130H has a terrain following radar to permit low-level penetration of hostile or 
denied territory.       
As with the AC-130, the MC-130 fleet has undergone modifications with 
extensive self-protection features and a host of mission specific features.  These aircraft 
modifications include: re-enforced doors for high-speed airdrops, enhanced navigation 
equipment to permit low altitude penetration missions and precision airdrop, aerial 
refueling pods to provide gas to vertical lift assets, and include the ability to receive fuel 
airborne from both KC-10 and KC-135 refueling aircraft.  This refueling capability 
extends the flight range of the MC-130, enabling quicker worldwide deployment.  
However, it is these additional features that make the MC-130 fleet more expensive to 
operate, which in turn makes the MC-130 aircraft an unrealistic purchase for foreign 
nations.  As technology continues to develop, the cost of operating high-tech aircraft 
rises.  For many small nations’ air forces, even the C-130 is cost-prohibitive.    
AFSOC needed an aircraft that could provide smaller lift capability but operate in 
more austere locations, including short and unimproved surfaces.   The solution was to 
acquire a fleet of PC-12 aircraft, renamed the U-28A.  The single-engine U-28A has been 
certified to land on dirt and grass strips.  It can carry up to nine passengers with a 
maximum cargo weight of 3,000 pounds.92   This aircraft was acquired specifically to 
                                                 
91 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “MC-130E/H Combat Talon I/II; MC-130W Combat Spear; MC-130P 
Combat Shadow,” http://www.af.mil/infomration/factsheets (accessed October 16, 2009). 
92 “U-28A,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft (accessed October 21, 2009). 
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provide Special Operations Forces (SOF) with intra-theater airlift that did not require the 
use of the C-130.  Another transport aircraft AFSOC is currently acquiring is the title 
rotor CV-22, a hybrid aircraft that lands like a helicopter but flies like and airplane.     
When the MH-53J Pave Low III helicopters were retired in 2008, AFSOC lost its 
vertical lift capability.  To replace that capability, AFSOC invested in the CV-22 Osprey, 
which reached initial operating capability in early 2009.  This aircraft is designed to 
conduct long-range infiltration, exfiltration and resupply of special operations forces by 
combining vertical takeoff/landing and hover qualities with long-range, fuel efficiency 
and speed characteristics of turboprop aircraft.  Similar to the Special Operations C-130 
fleet, the CV-22 includes integrated threat countermeasures, terrain-following radar, and 
a forward-looking infrared sensor in addition to modern avionics. 93  
The CV-22 still has many system bugs that must be worked out.  The aircraft has 
a turbulent history with multiple high profile crashes during development and testing.94  
These accidents stir some concerns about the basic concept of a vertical lift machine that 
transitions to level flight.  Over time, these concerns will be addressed and further 
technological advances will enable vertical lift/level flight capability.  This is still a new 
aircraft, so airmen have yet to explore the complex weapons system.  It will be telling to 
see how it performs in combat situations as well as what innovative tactics are developed 
to exploit the design of this aircraft.     
Vertical lift capability is vital to IW operations.  Helicopters are a cheap airpower 
alternative to acquiring the more expensive fixed wing aircraft which also require a much 
larger logistical and operational footprint.  The helicopter can be used as a gunship, flying 
low enough to be right overhead the infantry as they advance, providing gun, rocket and 
bombing capabilities.  In addition, these vertical lift aircraft provide battlefield mobility 
and the capability to quickly retrieve forces that may have been cut off or surrounded.  
The helicopter and its vertical lift capability permits it to reach areas traditional airplanes 
cannot.  This is a capability that can be critical to the success of an operation.   
                                                 
93 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “CV-22 Osprey,” http://www.af.mil/infomration/factsheets (accessed 
October 16, 2009). 
94 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “CV-22.” 
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Helicopters have also provided vitally important medical airlift in combat 
situations.  This capability is not limited to conventional combat, but is also critical to IW 
activities.  For example, the El Salvadorian military received six medical evacuation 
helicopters from the U.S. and had assistance in building a first-rate medical facility.  The 
medical facility treated wounds that in previous conflicts would have been fatal for the 
soldier.  The addition of having the medical evacuation helicopters saved many soldiers’ 
lives.  Dr. James Corum contends that this combination of medical aid and evacuation 
capabilities did more to increase the military effectiveness of the forces than any other aid 
provided by the United States.  Further, he states that when a soldier knows there is a 
dedicated helicopter to evacuate them to a hospital if he is wounded in battle, not only 
will it raise his individual morale, it will raise the morale of the unit.  In El Salvador, such 
units also experienced a significant increase in aggressiveness on the battlefield.95   
D.  AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE 
Aerial reconnaissance began years ago when observers hanging over the side of 
an airplane with a pair of binoculars observed enemy positions.  Today, both manned and 
unmanned aircraft provide aerial reconnaissance.  Manned aircraft that are best suited for 
this mission are those that have forward-looking infrared cameras.  Manned aircraft for 
aerial reconnaissance include the risk of exposing the crew to enemy fire or possible 
mechanical failure.  The advantages of manned reconnaissance include real-time decision 
making regarding the progress of the mission; the ability to redirect the mission as 
required; and to fly with a native observer who can provide a better picture than what is 
viewed through the sensor lens.  As the unmanned aircraft become more plentiful, and the 
capabilities expand, they will eventually assume a majority of the aerial reconnaissance 
roles.    
Airpower provides critical reconnaissance capabilities to the ground forces.  
Typically, in UW, the resistance force faces a large, organized force.  This force is  
 
                                                 
95 James S. Corum,  “It’s not Just Air Control Anymore: The Historical Evolution of Airpower in 
Counterinsurgency” (lecture, Air Force Counterinsurgency Symposium 2007, Maxwell AFB, AL, April 25, 
2007).   
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susceptible to exploitation through aerial reconnaissance to monitor troop strength and 
movements.  The ability to blend into the general population is the guerillas advantage.  
In addition, the guerillas can choose their place and time of engagement with the 
government forces.  With aerial reconnaissance, the guerillas have advanced warning of 
government forces concentrating and they can exploit weak or undefended territory and 
outposts.   
Today, the MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System can fly over the battlefield, 
providing persistent surveillance through an unblinking eye.  These aircraft collect 
battlefield imagery; carry light attack munitions for instantaneous strike capability; and 
provide real-time imagery linked directly to manned weapon systems either on the 
ground or on other airborne assets.96  With simple modifications, the MQ-1 imagery can 
be linked directly to an AC-130 gunship.  This enables the gunship crew to observe the 
target area and plan their attack profile enroute.  The amount of time saved identifying 
friendly positions, enemy positions, potential targets, etc. is critical.  By decreasing the 
time the gunship needs to acquire targets, it can limit the time an AC-130 is exposed to 
potential ground threats.  Additionally, reducing acquisition time enables the crew to 
engage enemy forces faster, making the difference between limiting friendly force 
casualties and a friendly position being overrun by enemy ground forces.97     
The AC-130 also provides aerial reconnaissance capabilities with targeting 
cameras.  The Infrared and TV cameras, as well as the pilots using night vision goggles, 
can observe the battlefield and alert ground units to possible enemy movements or 
concentrations.  One advantage the AC-130 currently has over the MQ-1 is the ability to 
communicate directly with ground forces to confirm targets and friendly positions, while 
remaining in position to engage the enemy.  The MQ-1 armament is limited to two laser 
guided Hellfire missiles while the AC-130 weapons can fire 1,800 rounds per minute 
from the 25mm Gatling gun; 100 rounds per minute from the 40mm and 6–10 rounds per 
                                                 
96 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, “MQ-1 Predator,” http://www.af.mil/infomration/factsheets (accessed 
October 16, 2009). 
97 Author’s personal experience while deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom, March–May 2004.  
The modification added a flat screen TV and antenna that enabled AC-130 crews to receive real-time 
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minute from the 105mm howitzer.98  The bullets have a smaller blast radius than the 
Maverick missile, which limits collateral damage.  For reconnaissance purposes, the 
smaller MQ-1 provides a limited noise signature compared to the larger, four engine C-
130.   
Both the AC-130 and MQ-1 can provide reconnaissance of drop and landing 
zones to mobility pilots.  Depending on the capability on the transport aircraft, these 
reports may have to be passed over the radio.  Both platforms can pass this information to 
the mobility aircraft.  Additionally, the AC-130 has two sensors searching the ground 
targets while the pilot uses night vision goggles to search a broader region.  As friendly 
forces maneuver on the ground, the overhead surveillance platforms provide them with 
information on their position, and more importantly the intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft can help identify enemy forces in the area that may be 
establishing ambush points or maneuvering to engage the friendly forces.  Airborne ISR 
enables the soldier on the ground to see over the next hill or around the corner and down 
the next block in order to better prepare for contact with the enemy.  Both manned and 
unmanned platforms provide critical battlefield intelligence as well as strike capabilities.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The role airpower plays in unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations is both critical and indispensable.  Airpower has the capability to 
erode an opponent’s power, will and influence.  It can enhance “government legitimacy, 
projects national sovereignty into remote areas, accelerates a nation’s overall 
development and provides an asymmetric advantage over adversaries.”99  Further, 
airpower “bolsters all instruments of national power and provides visible, practical and 
effective means to consolidate governance and provide for the populace.”100  Finally, 
airpower enables governments to: 
 Provide political leaders immediate, unimpeded access to all territory 
to demonstrate governance and legitimacy by delivering goods, 
services, and humanitarian relief. 
 Mitigate the traditional advantages of insurgents and terrorists: 
surprise, speed, stealth, maneuver, and initiative. 
 Strengthen internal security mechanisms that transcend fragmented 
tribal/ethnic geography by providing air mobility, aerial resupply, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); command and 
control; and strike. 
 Prevent insurgents from massing on the battlefield, and provides an 
option to strike them if they do. 
 Patrol and assist in securing porous border areas. 
 Deny insurgents and terrorists sanctuary in ungoverned and remote 
areas. 
 Complement and extend the reach of ground forces and internal 
security units. 
 Deter and defeat external aggression by presenting flexible and 
adaptable options in projecting capability beyond national boundaries. 
 Promote civil sector advancement, since air and cyber infrastructure is 
inherently dual-use.  Most notably, it enables technological and 
economic advancement, and fosters national identity and pride.101 
Due to the uniqueness of each UW and COIN situation, a cookie-cutter approach 
for the use of airpower is not feasible.  Rather, general characteristics of mission 
                                                 
99 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, “The 21st Century Air Force: Irregular Warfare White Paper,” 
(Washington, DC, April 7, 2008), 3. 
100 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, “The 21st Century Air Force: Irregular Warfare White Paper,” 3. 
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requirements exist, and it is a matter of applying the correct air asset, sometimes in a 
unique fashion.  Traditionally, airpower designated to support these missions has been 
victims of the Phoenix Cycle post conflict.  In order to break this cycle the U.S. Air Force 
must acquire new irregular warfare (IW) aircraft.  
Despite Air Force Special Operations Command’s (AFSOC) fleet of C-130 
aircraft and CV-22 tilt rotor aircraft, the command is lacking small aircraft that can 
operate successfully in a wide range of IW environments.  Specifically, the largest 
constraint that the Air Force faces today in worldwide application of airpower for IW is 
airfield restrictions.  Austere fields pose a significant hazard to modern jet engines due to 
damage caused by small rocks or other debris that often cover the field.  Future trouble 
spots have a preponderance of small airfields.  These airfields are generally less than 
3000 feet in length and/or have low weight-bearing capacity, which significantly limits 
the type of aircraft that can land. 
In a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum, 42 “priority countries” were 
listed as having the potential to be future hotspots.  Throughout these 42 countries, 
10,326 active airfields were identified.  Of those, 90% were unable to handle a C-130 due 
to pavement strength, or load classification number (LCN).  A total of 84% of the 
airfields could not support the C-27J due to pavement strength.  Finally, 45% of the 
runways were less than 3000 feet.102  These percentages are depicted in figure 5.   
  
Figure 5.   Operational Constraints (runway strength & length)103 
                                                 
102 Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, “Posturing the Air Force for the Long War: A Strategic 
Perspective,” (pre-decisional briefing, Air Staff, Pentagon, September 13, 2006). 
103 From Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, “Posturing the Air Force for the Long War: A Strategic 
Perspective.”  
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With these operational constraints, the current AFSOC fleet is inadequate to 
perform worldwide missions in support of IW.  The most economical solution to develop 
a fleet of IW aircraft would be to focus on short take-off and landing capabilities, rugged 
design to enable austere operating locations and turboprop aircraft to minimize hazards 
when operating from the austere locations.  Additionally, turboprop aircraft are easier to 
maintain than jet aircraft.   
The ideal IW aircraft must be versatile and able to perform several missions.  For 
example, a light attack aircraft can perform close air support (CAS), interdiction and 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.  A multi-role utility aircraft 
must be able to perform ISR, command and control, light cargo, medical evacuation and 
even CAS.  A mobility asset should be able to carry light vehicles and up to an infantry 
platoon.  Finally, vertical lift aircraft should be able to perform any mixture of the above 
missions.   
In addition to the new aircraft, the Air Force must decide on how to organize for 
an IW campaign.  One option for organization would be to stand up a separate IW 
squadron, group, and/or wing.  Another option would be to distribute the newly acquired 
IW assets and bring them together to form an IW composite group as the need arises.   
Organizationally, the Air Force could establish a new IW squadron, group, and /or 
wing.  This new organization’s task would be to maintain the U.S. Air Force’s capability 
to support IW missions.  The organization would be extremely flexible and have a 
worldwide focus.  Once the decision is made to engage in an IW campaign, the 
organization will tailor its training program to focus on the selected country.  A major 
drawback to this proposal is the cost associated with development of an entire new 
organization.  General administration functions would duplicate effort of organizations 
already in existence throughout the Air Force. 
If standing up a new organization is infeasible, the Air Force should consider 
spreading the IW capability throughout the current force structure.  This enables the IW 
airmen to rely upon already established support features.  In times of crisis, the IW 
specific aircraft would be selected based on the needs of the situation.  This organization 
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would resemble the Task Force structure that is currently used by special operations 
forces.  The ability to draw upon what resources are necessary to accomplish the mission 
at hand is what makes the Task Force concept both economical and militarily potent.  
Ideally, the necessary capabilities in aircraft will be developed and procured in a timely 
manner.  This will ensure that when a Task Force must be created, all necessary parts will 
be available to meet the missions as required.  Another advantage to this system would be 
that the IW capability is throughout the Air Force spreading knowledge about IW 
capabilities, which will permit airmen to become more familiar with IW as a concept.  
Hopefully, the U.S. Air Force will reach a point at which it will no longer have to 
reinvent the wheel each time a crisis occurs.   
The airmen assigned to IW billets must be expert aviators who can employ these 
smaller aircraft in austere conditions, and be prepared for lengthy engagements with the 
forces the U.S. is supporting.  The airmen would also benefit from training with the U.S. 
Army Special Forces (SF) counterparts who will engage the resistance leaders in the UW 
campaign.  Depending on the situation that develops for COIN, a combination of IW 
airmen working with the SF advisors would provide the biggest benefit.  It cannot be 
stressed enough; each UW and COIN situation is unique and must have tailored 






Asymmetric Warfare:  a conflict between two foes of vastly different capabilities where 
belligerents can differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each 
other’s characteristic weaknesses.  This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two 
powers have similar military power and resources and rely on conventional warfare 
tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution. 104 
 
Clandestine Operation:  an operation sponsored or conducted by governmental 
departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.  A 
clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that the emphasis is placed on 
concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor.105  
  
Covert Operation:  an operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the 
identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.  A covert operation differs from a 
clandestine operation in that the emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the 
sponsor rather than on the concealment of the operation.106   
 
Generations of Warfare:  
1st Generation:  tactics of line and column; developed in the age of the smoothbore 
musket. 
 
2nd Generation:  tactics of linear fire and movement, reliance on indirect fire. 
 
3rd Generation:  tactics of infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy’s combat forces 
rather than seeking to close with and destroy the enemy; defense in depth. 
 
4th Generation:  tactics of secrecy, terror, and confusion to overcome the asymmetrical 
gap characterized by a “stateless” entity fighting a state. 107 
 
Guerilla Warfare:  a method of combat where a small group of combatants use mobile 
tactics (ambushes, raids, etc) to combat a larger and less mobile formal army.  The 
guerilla army uses ambush (stealth and surprise) and mobility (draw enemy forces to 
terrain unsuited to them) in attacking vulnerable targets in enemy territory. 108 
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